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DELAWARE'S OMNIPOTENT BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: WHO
SPEAKS FOR THE SHAREHOLDERS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the American public may have become accustomed to the
high-profile courtroom battles which seem to be a by-product of the
1980's takeover mania, many individuals would be surprised to learn
that the law used as a basis for such decisions is itself still in the evolu-
tionary process. In fact, the oft-stated legal truism that the law is con-
stantly changing has no finer proving ground than in the Delaware
courts' decisions which attempt to define the fiduciary duties of directors
in the ever-evolving world of corporate takeovers. Such rapid change
can trace its roots to the seemingly endless stream of new defensive
takeover tactics which the parties to such battles create.'
1. A variety of defensive tactics, defined in colorful terminology, have been
utilized to ward off hostile takeover bids:
"Golden parachutes" are contracts made with senior management
that provide substantial benefits if the executive leaves the target cor-
poration after a change in control. An executive protected by a golden
parachute may be entitled to an amount equal to several years of com-
pensation if displaced by a hostile takeover. Golden parachutes have
the effect of increasing the cost of a takeover but are defended as creat-
ing a parity of interest between shareholders and management which
allows management to act objectively in the face of a hostile takeover
bid. On the other hand, many feel that executives who enter into such
contracts are violating their fiduciary duties and wasting corporate
assets.
"Crown jewel options" are options granted by a target to a third
party to purchase the targets' most valuable assets in order to discour-
age a hostile bidder from acquiring the target.
"Poison pills" involve the issuance of authorized unissued pre-
ferred stock to shareholders with rights to purchase the company's
stock at below market prices upon certain triggering events such as a
takeover. These rights may "flip over" and allow the shareholders to
acquire shares of the bidding company at below market prices.
"Shark repellents" are provisions in the target company's articles
of incorporation or bylaws which are designed to deter a bidder's inter-
est in the target. Examples of shark repellents include staggering the
terms of the board of directors, supermajority voting, and "fair price"
provisions, which require supermajority voting unless at least a certain
price is paid for the target.
A "Pac-Man" defense is one in which the target company defends a
hostile tender offer by making its own offer for the stock of the hostile
bidder in an "I'll eat you before you eat me" struggle.
A "white knight" is a third party, friendly to target management,
which rescues the target from a hostile takeover by either entering into
a friendly merger with the target or assisting the target in a defensive
tactic such as a crown jewel option.
Andre, Tender Offers for Corporate Control: A Critical Analysis and Proposals for Reform,
12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865, 868-69 nn.15-20 (1987) (citations omitted) (legislative
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The confusion sometimes caused by these decisions is understanda-
ble when practitioners look for guidance to cases which are facially simi-
lar but which result in dissimilar holdings.2 Subtle differences in
complex and voluminous fact patterns provide the basis for different
outcomes. It is therefore difficult for practitioners to find broad state-
ments of policy in these decisions.
Cases interpreting Delaware corporation law in the context of a bat-
tle for corporate control set an intermediate standard for judicial review
of board action by shifting the initial burden of demonstrating a corpo-
rate or shareholder benefit to the directors. 3 The shifting of this burden
is proper because of the "omnipresent specter" of director self-interest
inherent in such high-stakes battles. 4 When, however, the "break-up"
reform in tender offer process needed due to courts' insensitivity to inherent
conflict between self-interested management and shareholders, who are de-
prived of marketplace opportunities by management's defensive tactics).
For a discussion of the defensive use of lock-up agreements, no-shop provi-
sions, goodbye fees, and topping fees within the context of corporate takeovers,
see infra notes 47-49, 75 and accompanying text. See also A. FLEISCHER, TENDER
OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 388.47-388.190 (1983 & Supp.
1987); R. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN BUSINESS 399-404 (1989); M.
LIPrON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS §§ 6.01-.09[6] (1989).
2. An example of that confusion was the issue of whether Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), was a breach of
loyalty or a breach of due care decision. Justice Moore of the Delaware Supreme
Court resolved that issue when he stated
Following Revlon, there appeared to be a degree of "scholarly" debate
about the particular fiduciary duty that had been breached in that case,
i.e. the duty of care or the duty of loyalty. In Ivanhoe, we made it abun-
dantly clear that both duties were involved in Revlon, and that both had
been breached.
Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284 n.34 (Del. 1989)
(emphasis in original) (citing Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535
A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987)). For a discussion of how the application of the
original "Revlon duty" may have been expanded in subsequent cases to encom-
pass bright-line criteria implicit in words like "sale" and "change in control,"
see Reder, The Obligation of a Director of a Delaware Corporation to Act as an Auctioneer,
44 Bus. LAw. 275, 281 (1989).
3. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). The
holding in Unocal requires the directors of the target company to demonstrate to
a court's satisfaction that, as a threshold matter, the board has fulfilled its duty of
loyalty before being afforded the protection of the business judgment rule. See
Andre, supra note 1, at 891.
4. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. The Unocal court stated that although a board's
decisions when combatting a hostile takeover attempt are entitled to the same
deference as any other business judgment, the "omnipresent specter that a
board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the cor-
poration and its shareholders" created an enhanced duty that directors must
fulfill before the protections of the business judgment rule can be conferred. Id.
Directorial self-interest may be present where a target board approves a bid
because of promised post-transactional benefits or where a board rejects a bid in
order to insure their own job security. Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermedi-
ate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus.
LAw. 247, 247-48 (1989). Although the latter interest may be self-evident, the
[Vol. 35: p. 501
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of the corporate entity appears "inevitable," the Delaware Supreme
Court expressly limits directors' responsibilities to the corporation's
shareholders. 5 The directors are then charged with the so-called "Rev-
Ion duty," as first expressed in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc.,6 to obtain the best price for the shareholders when the
company is to be sold.
7
Recently, the scope of this Revlon duty has been expanded. 8 This
expansion has left open the questions of how broad the duty is and what
specific types of corporate actions trigger it.9 This duty on its face ap-
pears to limit a target board's use of defensive takeover tactics. Recent
former is more subtle and is just as pervasive. Id. at 247 n.2. The best example
of this type of benefit is a third-party leveraged buyout in which target manage-
ment takes an equity position. In such a transaction, target management ac-
quires a substantial ownership interest in the company if the buyout is
successful. Id. A sample of 28 companies given management buyout proposals
between 1979 and 1984 showed that target management's ownership interest in
the target at the time of the proposal averaged 6.5%; in the 15 consummated
buyouts, target management's interest rose to an average of 24.3% after the
transaction. Id.
5. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. One commentator has suggested that the Revlon
court intended to limit the meaning of the break-up concept to "the inevitable
destruction of the corporate entity." See Reder, supra note 2, at 278. This oc-
curred in Revlon when, because of the increasing incremental bidding of Pantry
Pride, "it became apparent to all that the break-up of the company was inevita-
ble." Id. (quoting Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182). For a discussion of the expansion of
the break-up concept to its present form, which includes "sales" and other cor-
porate restructurings resulting in a "change in control," see infra notes 109-13
and accompanying text.
Initially, this concept of break-up was believed to be the crux of Revlon. In
fact, "inevitability" appears to be the true Revlon trigger. Although the break-up
concept of Revlon has been expanded in recent years, the Delaware Supreme
Court has found inevitability to be the determinative factor in holding that cor-
porate transactions which otherwise come within the expanded scope of Revlon
do not invoke Revlon duties. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.,
535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987) (declaration of dividend and amendment of
standstill agreement resulting in increased ownership of largest shareholder
amounted to corporate restructuring under Revlon, but because sale of company
not "inevitable," Revlon duties were not invoked).
6. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
7. Id. at 182. For a discussion of the policy behind this enhanced duty, see
infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
8. See Reder, supra note 2, at 280-81. For a discussion of the cases which
expanded Revlon, and the reasons behind such expansion, see infra notes 109-13
and accompanying text. The Revlon duty facially limits the target's use of defen-
sive tactics because these tactics are generally used to prevent the sale or re-
structuring of the target corporation. Without a completed transaction, the
shareholder maximization duty of Revlon may be violated unless target manage-
ment can justify its actions.
9. TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., No. 10298, slip op. at 25
(Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989). The court noted that central to the resolution of this
case was whether the target was in the "Revlon mode." See generally In re Holly
Farms Corp., 564 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1989); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 10389
(Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989), appeal denied, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1989); In re Fort
Howard Corp., No. 9991 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988).
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decisions of the Delaware courts, however, have held that defensive tac-
tics which "tilt the playing field"' 0 in favor of one party, and at first
blush appear to jeopardize escalating corporate auctions, may be valid if
a "shareholder benefit""I can be demonstrated. The Delaware courts'
interpretation of the concept of shareholder benefit determines just how
effective Revlon and its progeny will be in preventing management en-
trenchment disguised as shareholder interest in the takeover arena.
This article will attempt to aid practitioners on both sides of take-
over struggles by examining the most recent Delaware decisions, not
only to clarify the current state of the law, but also to analyze the factors
courts look to in deciding which board actions are valid and consistent
with its fiduciary duties to shareholders. 12 Armed with such knowledge,
practitioners for target clients will be better able to advise directors on
10. The MacMillan court noted the theory behind this granting of a limited
right to favor one bidder over others:
We do not intend to limit the broad negotiating authority of the direc-
tors to achieve the best price available to the stockholders. To properly
secure that end may require the board to invoke a panoply of devices,
and the giving or receiving of concessions that may benefit one bidder
over another.
Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1988); see In
re Fort Howard Corp., No. 9991, slip op. at 35 (target board may favor one bidder
over others if done in good faith belief that shareholder interests will be ad-
vanced); In reJ.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 781-82 (Del. Ch. 1988) (Revlon
does not purport to restrict powers of disinterested board in conducting com-
pany auction, board may tilt playing field if there is shareholder benefit), appeal
denied, 540 A.2d 1088 (Del. 1988).
11. J.P. Stevens, 542 A.2d at 782-84. The "shareholder benefit" theory as-
sumes that all shareholder interests are congruent, a concept of questionable
validity. In TW Services the chancery court reasoned that there are both long-
term and short-term shareholder interests. TWServs., No. 10298, slip op. at 18.
An example of the former are institutional and pension plan investors interested
in sustained, long-term growth; an example of the latter are the arbitragers who
buy stocks based upon merger rumors in hopes of a quick return on their invest-
ment. Where both interests are present, the court concluded that there arises a
difference in directorial fiduciary duties owed to each group. Id. at 20. The TW
Services court held that conflicts between the two groups should be resolved in
favor of the long-term shareholders since their interests are congruent with the
corporate entity's. Id. at 18, 20. This holding therefore completes the priority
of interests a corporate director must honor, with long-term shareholder inter-
ests being primary to short-term shareholder interests, which pursuant to Revlon
are primary to non-shareholder interests such as noteholders. See Revlon, 506
A.2d at 182.
12. Factors that support a target corporation's defense to breach of fiduci-
ary duty charges when in the Revlon mode include the appointment of an in-
dependent negotiating committee consisting of independent directors and the
retention of an independent financial adviser to evaluate the adequacy of the
acquiring corporation's bid. See Veasey, The New Incarnation of the Business Judg-
ment Rule in Takeover Defenses, 11 DEL.J. CORP. L. 503, 510-11 (1986). This inde-
pendence, however, can be disputed by a would-be acquiring corporation, as
was successfully done in MacMillan. There, the Delaware Supreme Court found
breaches of both the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in spite of the target's
use of such practices. MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1264.
[Vol. 35: p. 501
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how to protect their corporate interests. Practitioners for would-be ac-
quiring entities will be better able to advise their clients on the obstacles
a well prepared target can place in their path. This prospective advice
will help both sides avoid unnecessary litigation.
II. BACKGROUND
Under well-established principles of corporate law, the board of di-
rectors assumes the responsibility for managing the business and affairs
of the corporation. '3 In discharging this responsibility, directors of Del-
aware corporations become fiduciaries 14 of the corporation and its
shareholders, a legal status which imposes upon them the twin duties of
care and loyalty.' 5 However, because directors need to operate without
13. MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1280. In Delaware the responsibility for manag-
ing the business and affairs of the corporation is codified by state law. The ap-
plicable portion of the statute states: "The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the di-
rection of a board of directors." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983).
14. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939).
15. See Andre, supra note 1, at 888. The duty of care was originally a com-
mon law principle which has been codified in most states. Id. This duty requires
a director to carry out his functions in good faith, in a manner which he reason-
ably believes furthers the best interests of the corporation, and with such care as
an ordinarily prudent person in similar circumstances would use. Id. Delaware's
version of this rule -increases the director's protection by requiring gross negli-
gence, rather than the simple negligence required under the "ordinarily prudent
person" test. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 & n.6 (Del. 1984). For a
discussion of what the Delaware courts have interpreted "gross negligence" to
mean in the context of directorial decisions, see infra note 19 and accompanying
text.
The duty of loyalty requires directors to act for the benefit of the corpora-
tion and precludes them from engaging in self-interested transactions. See An-
dre, supra note 1, at 888-89. Upon a showing that a director had an interest in
the transaction, acted in bad faith, or engaged in corporate activity for any other
improper purpose, the protection of the business judgment rule cannot be in-
voked. Id.
Although the Delaware judiciary has never stated which of the two duties it
considers to be more important, the Delaware legislature, by allowing directors
of Delaware corporations to immunize themselves from breaches of the duty of
due care, but not from breaches of the duty of loyalty, has implied that loyalty
breaches are the more egregious of the two. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988). Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code enables a
Delaware corporation to include in its original certificate of incorporation or an
amendment thereto a provision eliminating or limiting a director's personal lia-
bility to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages arising from a
breach of fiduciary duty. Id. However, the statute does not permit limitation of
liability for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
shareholders. Id.; see Balotti & Gentile, Elimination or Limitation of Director Liability
for Delaware Corporations, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 11 (1987).
The legislative purpose asserted for this immunization from duty of care
liability was that the large potential personal liability of directors had caused the
cost of director's liability insurance to skyrocket. Id. at 10. Therefore, many
companies chose to forego this protection, resulting in fewer people willing to
serve on corporate boards. Id. The Delaware legislature felt that this removed
1990] 505
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fear of personal liability for honest errors in judgment, and to relieve
the courts of the burden of deciding the propriety of complex business
decisions, 16 the Delaware courts have developed a protective device
known as the "business judgment rule."1 7 The business judgment rule,
and the standards which directorial conduct must meet to invoke it, are
particularly important in the takeover area.18 In actions for breach of
entrepreneurial talent from the marketplace, and attempted a statutory remedy
in § 102(b)(7). Id.; see also Pease, Outside Directors: Their Importance to the Corpora-
tion and Protection from Liability, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 25 (1987) (vast potential per-
sonal liability and difficulty in obtaining insurance create adverse effect on
corporations' ability to attract and retain experienced outside directors; amend-
ments to Delaware General Corporation Law allowing limitation of liability for
some violations of director fiduciary duties sought to remedy this situation).
Apparently, the legislature reasoned that liability for negligent, albeit good-
faith, violations of the duty of due care were a different matter than the inten-
tional acts of self-interest which accompany breaches of the duty of loyalty.
Granting statutory protection for breaches of loyalty would reduce the fiduciary
duties of corporate directors to the status of unenforceable ethical obligations.
16. See Andre, supra note 1, at 888.
17. The business judgment rule has been categorized as
a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a cor-
poration acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.
Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the
courts. The burden is on the party challenging the decision to establish
facts rebutting the presumption.
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (citations omitted). One commentator has defined the
rule as follows:
[T]he Business Judgment Rule is that a transaction which involves no
self-dealing by the directors or no personal interest of the directors will
not be enjoined for misconduct of directors ... unless the record dis-
closes at least one of three circumstances or conditions: (1) that the
directors did not exercise due care to ascertain the relevance of the
available facts before voting to authorize the transaction; or (2) that the
directors voted to authorize the transaction even though they could not
have reasonably believed the transaction to be for the best interest of
the corporation; or (3) that in some other way the directors' authoriza-
tion of the transaction was not in good faith. The Business Judgment
Rule is circumscribed by two important limitations .... Those limita-
tions are: (1) it is available only to a director who has no personal inter-
est in the transaction; and, (2) only if he has paid informed attention to
his duties.
Arsht, Fiduciary Responsibilities of Directors, Officers and Key Employees, 4 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 652, 660 (1979) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted) (author discusses
business judgment rule's application and relationship to directorial fiduciary du-
ties, and defends against charges that courts utilizing rule favor management
and deal unfairly with stockholders).
18. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984). In Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985), the court noted that there
are "certain caveats" to a target board's business judgment protection when it
addresses a pending takeover bid. The Delaware Supreme Court recognized
that although there is a greater need for the protection of the business judgment
rule in the context of takeover battles, such protection was particularly suscepti-
ble to abuse, and target board action must withstand the Unocal intermediate
standard of review to earn it. Id. at 954-55; see Pease, supra note 15, at 67. For a
506
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fiduciary duty, the application of the business judgment rule places on
the plaintiff the heavy burden of establishing that the directors were
grossly negligent. 19 However, if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
transaction involved self-interest or bad faith, the director loses the pro-
tection of the business judgment rule, and the plaintiff need no longer
meet this heavy burden.20
Due to the "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primar-
ily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders," 2 1 the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co. 2 2 declared that directors addressing a pending takeover bid
discussion of Unocal and the intermediate standard of review, see infra notes 21-
32 and accompanying text.
19. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. Since the Delaware courts have not elected
judicially to define this standard, its determination is made on a case-by-case
basis. Id. at 812 n.6. The single common thread that runs through all the cases
is that director liability is based upon a less exacting standard than that of simple
negligence. Id. The Aronson court cited the following cases to support this
position:
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971), rev'k 261
A.2d 911 (Del. Ch. 1969) ("fraud or gross overreaching"); Getty Oil
Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. 1970), rev g 255 A.2d 717
(Del. Ch. 1969) ("gross and palpable overreaching"); Warshaw v. Cal-
houn, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966) ("bad faith.., or a gross abuse
of discretion"); Moskowitz v. Bantrell, 190 A.2d 749, 750 (Del. 1963)
("fraud or gross abuse of discretion"); Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker,
298 A.2d 349, 351 (Del. Ch. 1972) ("directors may breach their fiduci-
ary duty.., by being grossly negligent"); Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d 136,
140 (Del. Ch. 1960) ("fraud, misconduct or abuse of discretion"); Al-
laun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 147 A.2d 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929) ("reck-
less indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the stockholders").
Id.
20. Andre, supra note 1, at 889.
21. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
22. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). In Unocal minority shareholder and cele-
brated corporate raider T. Boone Pickens' Mesa Petroleum Co. (Mesa) made a
hostile two-tiered tender offer for Unocal Corporation (Unocal). Id. at 949.
Pickens first sought to acquire the 37% of Unocal he needed to acquire majority
control of the company through a front-end loaded cash offer of $54 per share,
and planned to acquire the remaining 49% of the shares through a back-end
offer ofjunk bonds purportedly the equivalent of the $54 front-end price. Id. at
949-50. Unocal's board rejected the Mesa offer as "grossly inadequate" and re-
sponded by making a defensive self-tender offer which stipulated that upon
Mesa's acquisition of majority control through its front-end $54 cash offer, Uno-
cal would buy the remaining 49% of the outstanding shares for debt securities
with an aggregate par value of $72 per share. Id. at 950-51. Importantly, the
Unocal offer was made conditional upon the exclusion of Mesa from the propo-
sal, and Unocal's directors agreed to tender their own stock as a gesture of confi-
dence in the exchange offer. Id. at 951.
Mesa argued that because the offer was open to all shareholders except
Mesa, it was a discriminatory offer. Id. at 953. Mesa also alleged that by tender-
ing their own shares in the exchange offer, Unocal's directors would be violating
the fiduciary duties they owed to Mesa, and thereby would forfeit the protection
of the business judgment rule because the directors would derive a financial
benefit not available to all Unocal shareholders. Id. Unocal contended that its
7
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assume an "enhanced duty" and, therefore, prior to invoking the pro-
tection of the business judgment rule, the board must meet a two-part
test.2 3 First, the target's directors must establish that the pending bid
represents a "threat,"' 24 i.e., that the directors had or have reasonable
directors had acted in good faith in both the rejection of a coercive two-tiered
Mesa tender offer and the approval of the exclusionary self-tender offer. Id.
The Delaware Supreme Court held that a director's duty of care extended
to protecting the corporation from a perceived threat, whether the source be
third parties or other shareholders. Id. at 955. The court found that the coercive
nature of an inadequate two-tiered tender offer by a corporate raider with a na-
tional reputation as a "greenmailer" was a threat to Unocal's shareholders. Id.
at 956. The court noted that such a finding does not end the inquiry, concluding
that for "a defensive measure.., to come within the ambit of the business judg-
ment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed." Id. at 955.
The court found that the board's stated objective of defeating Mesa's inadequate
offer, or in the event that the offer should succeed, to protect the interests of the
49% of the shareholders on the back-end of the transaction, was valid. Id. at
956. Because these objectives would be thwarted by Mesa's participation in the
self-tender offer (i.e., Unocal would effectively be subsidizing Mesa's $54 per
share offer with a $72 back-end payout), the selective self-tender offer was held
by the court to be "reasonably related to the threats posed." Id.
23. Id. at 954-55; see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 251 (Unocal duty
established intermediate standard ofjudicial review which contemplates genuine
effort to distinguish defensive tactics that benefit shareholders from suspect tac-
tics designed to entrench management).
24. Examples of sufficient threats include inadequacy of the price offered,
the nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on non-
shareholder constituencies, the risk of non-consummation and the quality of the
securities being exchanged. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. As a caveat, note that Rev-
lon holds that concern for non-shareholder constituencies must not come at the
shareholders' expense. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182-84.
The actual threat found by the court in Unocal was the fact that the offer was
made by T. Boone Pickens, a man "with a national reputation as a 'green-
mailer.' " Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956; see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 252-
53. "Greenmail" describes a technique whereby the target corporation repur-
chases its own stock from a raider at a premium price that is unavailable to other
shareholders in order to prevent a takeover. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956 n.13. If
such selective stock repurchases are reasonably related to the takeover threat
posed, such a plan is not unlawful. Compare Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494,
503-04, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964) (repurchase of stock from dissident share-
holder to maintain business operations is legitimate) with Bennett v. Propp, 41
Del. Ch. 14, 20, 187 A.2d 405, 408 (1962) (repurchase of stock to maintain con-
trol over corporation is improper).
Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989), con-
tains the most comprehensive Unocal threat list. To cover potential greenmail
threats, MacMillan adds "the bidder's identity, prior background and other busi-
ness venture experiences; and the bidder's business plans for the corporation
and their effects on stockholder interests." Id. at 1282 n.29 (citations omitted);
see also Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341-42
(Del. 1987) (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955-56). Pursuant to Revlon, the MacMil-
lan court also expressly subordinated non-shareholder interests by stating that
although the board may consider the effect of both the bid and the potential
acquisition on non-shareholder constituencies, it may only do so if the impact
also "bears some reasonable relationship to general shareholder interests."
MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1282 n.29. Other additions to the Unocal list which merit
board consideration include the fairness and feasibility of the bid, the proposed
[Vol. 35: p. 501
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grounds for believing that a "danger to corporate policy and effective-
ness existed."'2 5 Directors can satisfy this prong of the test through a
showing of "good faith" and "reasonable investigation."' 26 The second
part of the Unocal test, the so-called "proportionality prong," requires
that the defensive measure taken by the board be "reasonable in relation
to the threat posed." 2 7 This proportionality prong is the major change
or actual financing for the offer and the consequences of that financing. Id. This
growing list of judicially recognized threats demonstrates two things: the Dela-
ware courts' willingness to have the law keep pace with the ever changing corpo-
rate climate, and the ease with which competent counsel can create new threats
to corporate policy.
Evidence of the above two points can be seen in Paramount Communications
Inc. v. Time Inc., where Time's board of directors claimed that Paramount's hos-
tile bid represented a "threat" to the distinctive "Time culture". No. 10670, slip
op. at 10 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 565 A.2d 280-81 (Del. 1989) (Table).
The chancery court defined this culture "in part to be pride in the history of the
firm . . .and in part a managerial philosophy and distinctive structure that is
intended to protect journalistic integrity from pressures from the business side
of the enterprise." Id. Paramount countered that the "Time culture" was noth-
ing more than a disguised attempt to entrench present management. Id. The
court held that the "Time culture" concern of Time's board was valid because
there was no evidence that in satisfying this concern the directors had sacrificed
or ignored their duty to seek the maximization of the long-term interests of the
corporation and its shareholders. Id. at 17-18. For a discussion of the facts and
holding of Time, see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
25. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (citation omitted). This first prong of Unocal
traces its origin back to Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Del.
1964). For a discussion of the facts and holding of Cheff, see infra notes 28-29
and accompanying text.
26. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (citing Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at 506, 199 A.2d at
555). The court also noted that an offer of such proof would be "materially
enhanced" when the board which approves the transaction is comprised of a
majority of outside, independent directors. Id.
Because the issue of directorial self-interest necessarily implicates facts
which are peculiarly within the director's knowledge of his own subjective intent,
the Delaware courts have placed the burden of proof on this issue on the direc-
tors. Veasey, supra note 12, at 509. The satisfaction of this burden requires a
showing of independence and reasonable investigation. Id. Mr. Veasey inter-
prets the "good faith" part of this test to mean "independence," and he explains
what the courts look for to satisfy both elements:
[T]he court[s] noted that the board was composed of a majority of
outside directors. The presence of this characteristic "heightened" the
presumption available to the board with respect to their independence
and their actions. The reasonable investigation element relates to the
board's process or methodology which the courts will scrutinize very
carefully in determining whether the directors examined all material
facts reasonably available to them and exercised due care in decision
making, or whether they were grossly negligent.
Id. (footnote omitted). For a discussion of how independent negotiating com-
mittees are important in directors' satisfaction of the good faith requirement,
and how independent financial advisers are essential to the reasonable investiga-
tion element, see infra note 139 and accompanying text.
27. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. Unocal attempted to put teeth into the old Cheff
standard by adding a second prong to its traditional policy-conflict analysis. See
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 251. Management can no longer qualify for
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from the law prior to Unocal, as embodied in Cheffv. Mathes.28 The Cheff
court held that directors could satisfy their initial burden by a showing
of good faith and reasonable investigation alone, provided the exercise
of business judgment appeared reasonable at the time made. 2 9
business judgment protection merely by pointing to a " 'danger to corporate
policy' based on a carefully orchestrated record." Id. After Unocal the defensive
tactic must also be demonstrated to be "reasonable in relation" to the alleged
threat. Id. The policy behind this proportionality prong was to insure that "[a]
corporation does not have unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by
any Draconian means available." Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
It has been suggested that the Delaware courts' application of the propor-
tionality prong will determine whether Unocal becomes a true obstacle to self-
interest, or, like the Cheff policy-conflict standard, just another legal hoop for
target boards to jump through. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 251.
Messrs. Gilson and Kraakman conclude that the proportionality prong could be
strengthened by requiring the target board to make a showing of how and when
management expects target's shareholders to do better than they would if the
board accepted the hostile offer. Id. at 268.
28. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964). In Cheff the president of
Maremont Automotive Parts, Inc. (Maremont) attempted to negotiate a merger
with Holland Furnace Company (Holland), but Holland decided that differences
in the sales practices of the two companies made such a transaction unwise. Id.
at 499, 199 A.2d at 551. Although claiming, in light of Holland's decision, to
have no further interest in the company, Maremont proceeded to secretly buy
up large amounts of Holland stock, and to press for representation on Holland's
board of directors. Id. at 499-500, 199 A.2d at 551. Holland's board, afraid
Maremont would seek to change its sales practices and thus radically affect the
way the company did business, addressed this threat to corporate autonomy by
electing to purchase Maremont's position in the company for a price in excess of
the prevailing market price. Id. at 500-02, 199 A.2d at 551-53. Disgruntled Hol-
land shareholders filed a derivative suit, alleging that the purchase of the stock
held by Maremont should be rescinded, as it was done for the purpose of insur-
ing the perpetuation of control of Holland by the incumbent directors. Id. at
502, 199 A.2d at 553. The Delaware Supreme Court, in reversing the chancery
court's finding that the purpose behind the board's purchase was to perpetuate
control, held that the board had met its burden of showing it had used good
faith and reasonable investigation in arriving at the conclusion that the stock-
holdings of Maremont represented a threat to the continued existence of Hol-
land. Id. at 508, 199 A.2d at 556. The Cheff court concluded that the board's
action was therefore entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule,
and the directors would not be penalized for honest mistakes in business judg-
ment. Id. at 505, 199 A.2d at 556-57.
As one commentary has stated, Cheff's resolution of the problem ofjudicial
review implicitly granted blanket protection of defensive tactics, because exper-
ienced takeover lawyers told their target clients that if, in good faith and after
reasonable investigation, they could locate a policy conflict with a would-be ac-
quirer, any defensive response would be shielded by the business judgment rule.
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 249-50. Unocal attempted to remedy this
shortcoming by adding the requirement that the defensive tactic be reasonable
in relation to the threat posed. For a discussion of the facts and holding of
Unocal, see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
29. Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at 506, 199 A.2d at 555. Because competent counsel
could always formulate an alleged policy conflict between the hostile bidder and
target management, the Cheff test inevitably resulted in a routine application of
the business judgment rule. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 249-50.
[Vol. 35: p. 501
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In bringing a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the party seeking
judicial review of a board's defensive measures must first allege specific
instances of improper conduct for a court to apply the intermediate Uno-
cal standard.30 Once this threshold pleading burden is met, however,
the burden of proof shifts to the target's directors, and "the challenged
transaction must withstand rigorous judicial scrutiny under the exacting
standards of entire fairness."' 3 ' Directors subject to this "entire fair-
ness" burden are required to demonstrate their good faith and the in-
herent fairness of all transactions in which they possess a financial,
business or other personal interest and which do not primarily benefit
the corporation or its shareholders generally. 3 2
The next watershed case after Unocal in the evolving takeover law
arena was Revlon. Revlon has achieved prominence 33 due to the Dela-
ware Supreme Court's imposition of the much-litigated Revlon duty.3 4
30. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del.
1989) (wrongful manipulation of board's deliberations by self-interested direc-
tors meets specific pleading requirement); Smith v. VanGorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
872 (Del. 1985) (lack of due care by board in approving interested director
transaction meets specific pleading requirement); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805, 815-16 (Del. 1984) (general allegations concerning board conduct in ap-
proving employment agreement do not meet specific pleading requirement).
31. MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1279 (citations omitted); see Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983). The concept of entire fairness has
two parts, "fair dealing and fair price." Id. at 711. " 'Fair dealing' focuses upon
the actual conduct of corporate fiduciaries in effecting a transaction, such as its
initiation, structure, and negotiation." MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1280. This ele-
ment also includes the duty of candor owed by directors to disclose all material
information. Id. "Fair price," in the context of a takeover battle for corporate
control, means getting the highest price reasonably available to the shareholders
under the circumstances. Id.; see also Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. The Weinberger
court, summarizing the rationale behind this fairness standard, stated that
"where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of establish-
ing its entire fairness." Id. at 710 (citations omitted). The court also noted that
strong evidence of fairness can be obtained by the appointment of an independ-
ent negotiating committee of outside directors to deal with a would-be acquirer
at arm's length, and in fact, the existence of such a committee could have ena-
bled the UOP directors to avoid liability in Weinberger. Id. at 710-11 n.7.
32. MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1280; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; Weinberger, 457
A.2d at 710. The primary motivations courts remain wary of are management
entrenchment, where target management is primarily concerned with job secur-
ity, and transactions where target management receives a post-transaction bene-
fit, such as an equity position in the new entity. For a discussion of the
pervasiveness of these interests, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
33. Although Revlon is of primary importance for its introduction of the
Revlon duty, the case is cited as authority on other issues as well. For example,
Revlon is cited for the proposition that although Unocal allows the consideration
of non-shareholder interests in analyzing a threat under the first prong of the
Unocal test, the board can only consider such interests if there is a benefit to the
shareholders as well. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. For a further discussion of this
aspect of Revlon, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
34. Justice Moore reasoned in MacMillan that Revlon only narrows the re-
sponsibility of the board to maximize current share value, that the board's duties
were still the same ones enunciated in Unocal, and that beyond that there "are no
1990]
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In Revlon, Revlon had repeatedly rejected Pantry Pride's attempts to ini-
tiate a friendly merger, claiming categorically that Pantry Pride's offers
were far below Revlon's intrinsic value.35 Alleging these "grossly inade-
quate" offers to be threats under Unocal, Revlon adopted a stock repur-
chase plan3 6 and a poison pill Note Purchase Rights Plan ("Rights
Plan") 3 7 as defensive measures. In response, Pantry Pride made a hos-
tile any-and-all cash tender offer,38 which was effectively blocked by the
Rights Plan and the restrictive Note covenants. 39 In spite of those two
obstacles, Pantry Pride continued to raise its cash bid to the Revlon
shareholders. 40
Unbeknownst to Pantry Pride, Revlon began negotiating with a
white knight,4 1 Forstmann Little ("Forstmann"), whereby Forstmann
special and distinct 'Revlon duties.' " MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1288. Despite this
express admonition, Delaware courts have taken to referring to the director obli-
gations imposed by Revlon as "duties." See, e.g., Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont
Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. 1987) (court noted allegations that
defendant directors breached duties imposed by Revlon); Paramount Communi-
cations Inc. v. Time Inc., No. 10670, slip op. at 60 (Del. Ch.July 14, 1989) (court
discussed whether future change in control triggers "Revlon duties"), aff'd, 565
A.2d 280-81 (Del. 1989) (Table); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 10389, slip op. at
54 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (court addressed argument that Revlon creates dis-
tinctive "Revlon duties"), appeal denied, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1989).
For a discussion of what the Revlon duty requires of corporate directors, see
supra note 8 and infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
35. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176-77.
36. Id. at 177. The stock repurchase plan called for the purchase by Revlon
of up to 10 million shares of its own stock. Id. Management would acquire this
stock by offering one Senior Note of $47.50 at 11.75% interest and 1/10 of a
share of preferred stock in exchange for one share of common stock. Id.
37. Id. Under the plan each Revlon shareholder would receive a dividend
of one Note Purchase Right for each share of common stock, entitling the holder
to exchange the stock for a $65 principal Revlon note at 12% interest with a
one-year maturity. Id. The Rights were triggered whenever anyone acquired
beneficial ownership of 20% or more of Revlon's stock, unless the acquirer
purchased all of the company's stock for $65 cash per share. Id. Finally, the
Rights were not made available to the acquirer and could be redeemed prior to
the occurrence of the 20% triggering event for $.10 each. Id. For a general
discussion of the poison pill defense tactic, see supra note 1.
38. Pantry Pride's offer was for 100% of all outstanding shares of Revlon
stock. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177. Stockholders were offered $47.50 per common
share and $26.67 per preferred share, conditioned only upon (1) Pantry Pride's
obtaining financing and (2) the redemption, rescission or voiding of the Rights
Plan. Id.
39. Id. The Notes contained covenants that limited Revlon's ability to incur
new liabilities, sell assets and pay dividends. Id. The assumption of these cove-
nants served to stymie Pantry Pride's attempted takeover, since the issuance of
debt securities to finance the takeover would cause Revlon to default on the
Notes. Id.
40. Id. Pantry Pride incrementally raised its offer from a low of $42 per
share to a high of $58 per share at the time it sought the injunction to block the
Revlon-Forstmann transaction. Id. at 177-79.
41. For a definition of "white knight," see supra note 1.
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would effect a leveraged buyout of Revlon.4 2 Forstmann was given ac-
cess to confidential Revlon financial data denied to Pantry Pride. 43 A
merger between Revlon and Forstmann was announced, the terms of
which included Revlon's waiver of the costly Note covenants. 4 4 Pantry
Pride was not deterred, however, as it again raised its cash bid and de-
clared its intention to top any Forstmann offer. 4
5
Upon threats of litigation from the holders of Revlon's Notes, the
value of which had dropped upon Revlon's waiver of their covenants,
Revlon and Forstmann were forced to negotiate a new merger agree-
ment.4 6 In exchange for a higher per share price and a promise to sup-
port the value of the Notes, Revlon granted Forstmann a "lock-up
option,"' 47 a "no-shop" provision4 8 and a "cancellation fee."' 49 Pantry
42. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. A leveraged buyout occurs when an investor
purchases a publicly held corporation through debt that is secured by the ac-
quired corporation's assets. Note, Post-Tender Offer Purchases: Rebalancing the
Scales, 65 TEX. L. REV. 185, 204 n.134 (1986).
43. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178.
44. Id.
45. Id. At a meeting between representatives of Pantry Pride, Forstmann
and Revlon, Pantry Pride announced that it would engage in "fractional bid-
ding," topping any offer made by Forstmann with a slightly higher one. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 178-79. A lock-up refers to the competitive advantage which a
target corporation will grant to a white knight to purchase valuable assets or
stock of the target at a favorable price, usually below market value. See Note,
Lock-Up Options: Toward a State Law Standard, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1068, 1068 & n. 1
(1983). However, "[i]f the lock-up price equals the market value of the assets,
there is no real bite or value to the lock-up." Herzel, Colling & Carlson, Misun-
derstanding Lockups, 14 SEC. REG. L.J. 150, 175 (1986). This is because the com-
peting bidder may not care whether he is acquiring the asset that is the subject
of the lock-up or its cash equivalent. Id. Therefore, for the lock-up to work, the
asset must be important enough and the price advantageous enough to make the
target corporation an undesirable acquisition upon exercise of the deterrent. Id.
Such a transfer "facilitates acquisition by that acquirer and impedes acquisition
by other potential acquirers by either making the acquisition more expensive or
less attractive." Nachbar, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.-
The Requirement of a Level Playing Field in Contested Mergers, and Its Effect On Lock-Ups
and Other Bidding Deterrents, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 473, 487 (1987) (footnote
omitted).
Although lock-ups are not per se illegal under Delaware law, their validity
depends upon whether they benefit shareholder interests. See Revlon, 506 A.2d
at 183; Thompson v. Enstar Corp., 509 A.2d 578 (Del. Ch. 1984). In the context
of a Revlon auction, lock-ups that "attract competing bids will be upheld, while
those which preclude competing bids will be overturned." Nachbar, supra, at
487 (footnote omitted). Mr. Nachbar suggests that although this Revlon lock-up
formulation appears to encourage competitive bidding generally, it is not help-
ful in deciding the validity of a lock-up in an individual case. Id. This lack of
guidance occurs because all lock-ups, by their very definition, encourage the bid
of the entity granted the lock-up and discourage the bids of all others. Id. at
488.
48. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178-79. A no-shop provision stipulates that the tar-
get company will not negotiate with other bidders. See Note, Delaware Serves
Shareholders the "Poison Pill": Moran v. Household International, Inc., 27 B.C.L.
1990] 513
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Pride then filed for injunctive relief, challenging these three provisions,
as well as the Rights Plan.
50
REV. 641, 642 n.8 (1986). These provisions are common in merger agreements
and become binding on the target once the agreement is signed. See Nachbar,
supra note 47, at 480. The no-shop provision does not, however, prohibit the
target board from receiving an unsolicited bid. Id. A similar provision is the
"fiduciary out" provision, in which the target board agrees to support the
merger agreement, but retains the right to solicit bids and negotiate with other
bidders if its fiduciary duties so require. Id. at 480-81.
The Revlon court held that although no-shop provisions are not per se illegal
under Delaware law, they were impermissible under Unocal once the Revlon duty
to sell to the highest bidder was imposed. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.
The general consensus is that the validity of no-shop provisions hinges
upon the context in which they are given, with the most important factor being
whether other interested bidders had an adequate opportunity to bid before the
no-shop clause was granted. Nachbar, supra note 47, at 483. If other bids have
been accepted, then the no-shop provision may be permissible, because its grant
may preserve a competitive auction by keeping bidders interested who would
otherwise be reluctant to make a bid, believing they were only a "stalking horse"
for higher bids. Id.
Fiduciary Out clauses are not a directorial concern under Revlon because, by
its very definition, such a clause allows the solicitation of higher bids if the fidu-
ciary duties of the target board so require. Id. at 481.
49. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178-79. "Cancellation," "goodbye" and "break-
up" fees are interchangeable terms, referring to a provision which allows a dis-
appointed bidder to receive a lump sum cash payment should the proposed
combination of bidder and target not occur. Nachbar, supra note 47, at 485.
Such an agreement's validity is determined as if it were a liquidated damages
provision, in that if the amount is considered reasonable in relation to the bid-
der's efforts and the magnitude of the transaction, the fee will be upheld. Id.
However, when the fee becomes so large that its payment will materially impact
the financial health of the target, it will be susceptible to challenge. Id.
In Revlon, Forstmann was granted a cancellation fee of $25 million in a $1
billion transaction, with payment conditioned upon either termination of the
merger agreement or an entity becoming a 20% shareholder in Revlon. Revlon,
506 A.2d at 178. The Revlon court affirmed the chancery court's enjoining of the
payment, holding that the cancellation fee was part of the overall plan to thwart
the hostile bidder's efforts, in violation of the director's duties. Id. at 184; accord
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 281-82 (2d Cir.
1986) ($9 million goodbye fee invalid because of risk that non-tendering share-
holders would bear costs if not consummated). But see Beebe v. Pacific Realty
Trust, 578 F. Supp. 1128, 1150-51 (D. Or. 1984) (cancellation fee equal to 1%
of value of transaction upheld as reasonable where bidder granted provision
made best offer after company had been shopped for some time); DMG, Inc. v.
Aegis Corp., No. 7619, (Del. Ch.June 29, 1984) (court refused to enjoin transac-
tions which precluded enforcement of losing bidder's lock-up, allowing bidder
to collect $1.5 million break-up fee pursuant to merger agreement).
50. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179. Pantry Pride originally sought injunctive relief
only from the Revlon Rights Plan, and then amended its complaint to also chal-
lenge the lock-up, cancellation fee and the exercise of the Rights and the Note
covenants. Id. In addition, Pantry Pride also sought a temporary restraining
order (TRO) to prohibit Revlon from transferring any assets to Forstmann. Id.
The chancery court granted Pantry Pride's TRO request and eight days later
granted its request for injunctive relief as well. Id. The chancery court held that
Revlon's directors, out of self-interested concern over their own personal liabil-
ity to the company's noteholders, had breached their duty of loyalty by engaging
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The Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon held that the Revlon duty
should be imposed only when the break-up of a corporation appeared
inevitable. 5 1 This duty was imposed on Revlon's directors when the bid
of Pantry Pride exceeded the value of Revlon as a going concern, but
not the value that a piece-by-piece or break-up 52 sale of the company
could bring about.5 3 Thus, shareholder benefit, as measured by return
on investment, would be greatest for Revlon's shareholders if the com-
pany were sold off in pieces by target management or by the would-be
acquirer, a fact that Revlon's board recognized when it authorized man-
agement to negotiate a sale of the company with third parties. 5 4 Be-
cause Revlon no longer faced the "grossly inadequate bid" 5 5 threat to
corporate policy that its board had alleged, the "question of defensive
measures became moot."' 56 At this point the company was not to be
sold to insure the preservation of the corporate entity, but rather was to
be broken up, leaving Revlon's board only one role: get the best price
possible for the shareholders. 5 7
In summary, Revlon requires that when the break-up of a company
in the transaction with Forstmann, rather than seeking to maximize the sale
price of the company in an auction for the shareholders' benefit. Id. Revlon
then appealed the grant of the injunction to the Delaware Supreme Court. Id. at
175.
51. Id. at 182. For a discussion of the significance of an inevitable break-up
in the context of imposing Revlon duties, see supra note 5 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of how the Delaware courts have expanded the break-up
concept since Revlon, see infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
52. A term used interchangeably with the break-up takeover is the "bust-
up" takeover, which refers to a situation where a corporate raider seeks to fi-
nance its acquisition by selling off unwanted pieces of the target corporation,
presumably at a substantial profit. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181 n. 12 (citing Moran v.
Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 n.4 (Del. 1985)).
53. The Revlon court noted that an orderly disposition of Revlon's assets
could generate between $60 to $70 per share, while the market value of the
company as a whole entity was in the mid-fifty-dollar range. Revlon, 506 A.2d at
177.
54. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182; see also Reder, supra note 2, at 278.
55. The grossly inadequate bid is target management's most popular rea-
son for opposing tender offers. See Andre, supra note 1, at 869 n.21. This ra-
tionale serves as the rallying cry to justify target management defensive tactics
that "protect" shareholder interests pursuant to Unocal. Id. Once the Revlon
duties are triggered, however, target management loses its best defense, and is
forced to look for a shareholder benefit to justify its tactics. Revlon, 506 A.2d at
182-83. The allegation of a shareholder benefit is required because the inevita-
ble break-up or "change in control" occurs in a sale where the competing bids
fall within a range in which an independent financial advisor considers the true
value of the stock to lie, and such bids cannot be grossly inadequate. Id. at 181-
83.
56. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182; see Reder, supra note 2, at 278. The issue of
defensive tactics is moot because without a threat to corporate policy sufficient
to meet the first prong of Unocal, there is no need to inquire about the "reasona-
bleness" of the response-any defensive tactic used in such a situation is a prima
facie violation of a board's fiduciary duties.
57. Reder, supra note 2, at 278.
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becomes inevitable, the duty of the board changes from the preservation
of the corporate entity to the maximization of current share value at a
sale for the shareholders' benefit.5 8 This holding significantly changed
the board's responsibilities under Unocal. The Revlon court reasoned
that a corporation involved in an inevitable break-up no longer faced
any threat to corporate policy or effectiveness from a grossly inadequate
bid, and therefore any defensive tactics taken by a target board would be
presumed to be motivated by self-interest unless a shareholder benefit
could be derived from it.5 9 In accordance with Revlon, this benefit must
manifest itself in the form of a competitive auction, ultimately leading to
a transaction most beneficial to shareholder interests, whether it
be by maximizing share values 60 or an otherwise "best possible
transaction."
6 1
After Revlon a favored tactic of bidders challenging a target's take-
over defenses is to claim that the target, at the time it instituted such
defenses, had been "put in play," or in the current takeover parlance,
was in the Revlon mode.62 Under this reasoning any defensive takeover
taken by the target would be contrary to the Revlon duty of transaction
58. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
59. Id. at 182-83.
60. Id. at 182. This "maximization of shareholder value" duty of Revlon has
been explained as follows:
The directors are responsible only to the shareholders when it becomes
clear to the directors that the corporation as an effective business entity
will not survive in recognizable form. From the moment the directors
perceive that clarity, their role shifts from beneficent fiduciaries for a
wide range of constituencies to auctioneers with the solitary goal of
achieving the highest price for the shareholders.
Reder, supra note 2, at 278-79.
61. In reJ.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770, 781 (Del. Ch. 1988). The max-
imization of shareholder value duty was expanded by theJ.P. Stevens court to
include transactions which may benefit shareholders in ways other than immedi-
ate share appreciation: "[Miaterial factors other than 'price' ought . . . to be
considered and, where appropriate, acted upon by the board. Such considera-
tion might include form of consideration, timing of the transaction or risk of
non-consummation." Id. at n.6 (court held board justified in considering threat
of non-consummation to proposed merger that antitrust laws posed, rather than
simply looking at price offered by two bidders in auction of company). For a
discussion of the facts and holding ofJ.P. Stevens, see infra notes 72-81 and ac-
companying text. For cases which adopt the best possible transaction, or the
"best available transaction" test as an alternative to the maximization of share-
holder value duty of Revlon, see generally Paramount Communications Inc. v.
Time Inc., No. 10670 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 565 A.2d 280-81 (Del.
1989) (Table); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 10389 (Del. Ch.Jan. 31, 1989), appeal
denied, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1989); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d
787 (Del. Ch.), appeal denied, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988); In re Fort Howard
Corp., No. 9991 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1988).
62. "Put in Play" and the "Revlon mode" are interchangeable terms that
mean the target board must meet their Revlon duties, since the corporation faces
an inevitable break-up. See Time, No. 10670, slip op. at 54 (plaintiff argued that
target board's actions placed target in "Revlon mode").
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maximization, since the defensive tactic could only have been intended
to defeat the bids of would-be acquirers made in the course of a corpo-
rate auction which would accomplish such maximization.63 The most
recent example of this attempt to extend Revlon occurred in Paramount
Communications Inc. v. Time Inc.64 In Time a group of shareholder-plain-
tiffs argued, inter alia, that Time's planned purchase of, and eventual
merger with, Warner Communications Inc. placed Time "in play" and,
hence, was a corporate sale or restructuring because Warner sharehold-
ers would own more than sixty percent of the combined entity, if
consummated. 6 5
Of the recent Delaware cases, Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan,
Inc. ,66 its progeny,6 7 and In reJ.P. Stevens & Co. 68 are most indicative of
63. See, e.g., Time, No. 10670 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989); In re Holly Farms
Corp., 564 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1989); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc., No. 10389 (Del
Ch. Jan. 31, 1989).
64. No. 10670 (Del. Ch. July 14,1989), aff'd, 565 A.2d 280-81 (Del. 1989)(Table). In Time, Time Inc. (Time) and Warner Communications (Warner)
sought to consummate a friendly combination of their companies which both
believed would be "of extraordinary benefit and promise" to their shareholders.
Time, No. 10670, slip op. at 3. Time was to purchase 100 million shares of
Warner at $70 per share, making Time the acquiring company in the deal. Id. at
1. Just 10 days before the transaction was finalized, Paramount Communications
(Paramount) made a $175 per share hostile bid for Time, which was eventually
raised to $200 per share. Id. at 25, 40. This offer was rejected by Time's board.
Id. at 27-28.
Paramount sought to enjoin the Time-Warner merger, alleging that Time's
board had a fiduciary duty to present the Warner transaction to Time's share-
holders. Id. at 3. Paramount believed Time's shareholders would reject the
merger in order to tender their shares to Paramount because Paramount's $200
per share bid represented a substantial premium over Time's pre-offer market
value. Id. at 2. In addition, a group of shareholder-plaintiffs who were joined
with Paramount in this consolidated action argued that the Time-Warner deal
had put Time into the Revlon mode because although Time was technically ac-
quiring Warner, the transaction was a corporate restructuring which culminated
in 62% of the combined entity's shares in the hands of former Warner share-
holders. Id. at 54-56.
Time countered these charges by claiming that Paramount's initial $175 of-
fer was inadequate and that the Warner transaction was in the best long-term
interests of the shareholders. Id. at 29-30. Time claimed it was not bound by
Revlon and thus was not required to seek short-term share value maximization
because it was the acquiring corporation, not the target, and thus the transaction
entailed no change in control. Id. at 55-56.
The chancery court held that the directors had used reasonable businessjudgment in finding the initial Paramount offer inadequate, and that, outside of
the Revlon mode, directors acting in good faith and in an informed manner are
free to seek long-term value even at the cost of immediate gains. Id. at 50-51.
The court found that since the Time board did not expressly resolve to sell the
company, and the merger agreement did not contemplate a change in control,
Revlon did not bind the board. Id. at 58-59.
65. Id. at 54, 56.
66. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989). For a discussion of the facts and holding of
MacMillan, see infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
67. See In re Holly Farms Corp., 564 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1989); In re RJR
1990]
17
Pietrafitta: Delaware's Omnipotent Business Judgment Rule: Who Speaks for the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
how the Delaware courts are currently applying the Revlon standard.
Each of these cases involved competing bids by would-be acquirers of
target corporations which had already reached an auction stage of nego-
tiations. Accordingly, it was undisputed that the threshold question of
Revlon's applicability had been answered in the affirmative. 69 Similarly,
each involved a hostile bidder being pitted against a target board-fa-
vored white knight.70 This situation is precisely the kind of potentially
self-interested board transaction against which Revlon was designed to
protect target shareholder interests. 7 '
InJ.P. Stevens the board had to choose between a hostile all-cash
offer from West Point, Inc. ("West Point") of $62.50 per share, where
the deal's consummation could be threatened or at least delayed due to
potential antitrust claims, and an all-cash offer of $64 per share from a
management favored white knight, Odyssey Partners ("Odyssey"). 72
Odyssey offered target management equity positions in the new entity as
well as job security, since Odyssey was only an operating company with
no capacity to run the newly formed enterprise. 73 Management chose
Nabisco, Inc., No. 10389 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989), appeal denied, 556 A.2d 1070
(Del. 1989). For a complete discussion of Holly Farms and RJR Nabisco, see infra
notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
68. 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988). For a complete discussion ofJ.P. Stevens,
see infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
69. See Holly Farms, 564 A.2d at 343; MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1264; RJR
Nabisco, No. 10389, slip op. at 1-2; JP. Stevens, 542 A.2d at 770, 772.
70. See Holly Farms, 564 A.2d at 343; MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1264; RJR
Nabisco, No. 10389, slip op. at 1-2;JP. Stevens, 542 A.2d at 770, 772. For a defi-
nition of "white knight," see supra note 1. For a discussion of how a "white
knight" was utilized: in Revlon, see supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text; in
J.P. Stevens, see infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text; in MacMillan, see infra
notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
71. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184. The Revlon court expressly warned target
boards that "when bidders make relatively similar offers, or dissolution of the
company becomes inevitable, the directors cannot fulfill their enhanced Unocal
duties by playing favorites with the contending factions." Id.
72. J.P. Stevens, 542 A.2d at 772, 774. Because West Point and Stevens were
both engaged in the home furnishings textile business, evaluation of West
Point's proposal involved a consideration of antitrust concerns not presented by
the Odyssey offer. d. at 774. Stevens' legal advisers gave a preliminary opinion
that a merger with West Point would "raise serious antitrust concerns" that
might delay a merger for a substantial period. Id. Significantly, West Point re-
fused to include in the merger agreement a contract provision requiring it to
divest itself of whatever assets the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found ob-jectionable from an antitrust perspective, and had not otherwise cooperated in
seeking FTC guidance. Id. at 778. Therefore, Stevens' Special Committee con-
cluded that "the risks presented by the antitrust concerns continued to render
West Point's proposal less advantageous" than Odyssey's offer. Id. Odyssey
posed no such antitrust concerns, as it was not an operating company, but rather
a New York partnership existing only as a conduit for affiliates JPS Acquisitions
Corp. and JPS Holding Corp. to acquire other corporate entities. Id. at 772,
774.
73. Id. at 779. The court noted that Odyssey was considered a white knight
by Stevens management for three reasons: (1) Odyssey had no capacity to run
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the Odyssey offer, despite the fact that (1) the antitrust claims regarding
the West Point offer were speculative, (2) West Point had expressed a
willingness to top the $64 Odyssey offer,7 4 and (3) the Odyssey offer was
made contingent upon the granting of a "topping fee," 75 a $19 million
break-up fee 76 and a fiduciary-out agreement. 7 7 The chancery court
held that, upon these facts, "entire fairness" did not mandate a neutral
playing field for all the players, 78 and "the board may tilt the playing
field if. . . it is in the shareholders' interest to do so."179 The court
concluded that Odyssey's last pre-litigation offer was higher and, due to
the antitrust issue, more likely to close quickly, and that these factors
provided a rational basis for the board's favoring of the Odyssey offer.80
Stevens; (2) Odyssey indicated it wanted present management to stay on; and (3)
Odyssey indicated that equity participation by Stevens management was possi-
ble. Id.
74. Id. at 778.
75. Id. at 777. A topping fee guarantees a favored bidder a fee based on a
percentage of the premium the target's shareholders actually receive over and
above the favored bidder's price from the ultimate purchaser. Id. InJ.P. Stevens,
Odyssey would receive 20%o of any amount over $64 per share that Stevens
shareholders ultimately realized upon sale of the corporation to West Point,
subject to an $8 million or $.40 per share cap. Id.
76. Id. For a definition and discussion of the effect and permissibility of
"break-up fees," see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
77. J.P. Stevens, 542 A.2d. at 777-78. For a discussion of the effect and per-
missibility of "fiduciary out clauses," see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
78. J P Stevens, 542 A.2d at 781-82; see Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701, 711-12 (Del. 1983) ("entire fairness" standard first articulated). For a dis-
cussion of the elements of the entire fairness standard, see supra note 31 and
accompanying text.
79. JP. Stevens, 542 A.2d at 782. The court reasoned that shareholder ben-
efit is a target board's goal, and if favoring one party helps further that goal,
such tactics are permissible. Id. This marked an important step by the chancery
court, because prior toJ.P. Stevens, it was thought that Revlon required, as West
Point argued, a "level playing field," which precluded the favoring of one bidder
over another in the context of a corporate auction. Id. at 781. TheJ.P. Stevens
court rejected West Point's argument:
Revlon recognizes that once a change in control is concededly in
the works, the responsibility of the board is limited to a [sic] facilitating
and achieving the best possible transaction for the shareholders. ...
While it is true, that once agreements of this kind are in place, they do
have the effect of tilting the playing field in favor of the holder of such
rights, that fact, alone, does not establish that they necessarily are not
in the best interest of the shareholders. It is the shareholders to whom
the board owes a duty of fairness, not to persons seeking to acquire the
Company. To continue with the metaphor, the board may tilt the play-
ing field if, but only if, it is in the shareholders' interest to do so.
Id. at 781-82.
80. Id. at 785. The court held that theJ.P. Stevens board complied with its
Revlon duty by taking what it in good faith believed to be the best possible trans-
action for the shareholders. Id. at 781 n.6. Because choosing the best possible
transaction can involve board consideration of factors other than price, the court
held that the J.P. Stevens board's good faith concern that the risk of non-con-
summation posed by the potential antitrust problems involved in a merger with
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Moreover, the market place offered West Point an adequate remedy be-
cause West Point remained free to top Odyssey's offer.8 '
In MacMillan white knight Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR)
and hostile-bidder Mills Acquisition Co. (controlled by financier Robert
Maxwell, and thus hereafter referred to as "Maxwell"), were involved in
a Revlon auction for MacMillan.8 2 Despite a representation to the chan-
cery court that very morning that MacMillan would conduct a fair auc-
tion, Edward P. Evans, MacMillan's chief executive officer, telephoned
KKR to disclose the supposedly confidential details of Maxwell's bid.83
In addition, MacMillan's supposedly independent financial adviser,
Bruce Wasserstein, in relaying instructions to both bidders prior to the
submission of their final bids, gave additional information to KKR alone,
consisting of changes MacMillan's board needed from KKR before the
board could approve KKR's offer.8 4 Prior to either disclosure, KKR's
bid was $89.50 per share, $82 of which was cash, with the balance con-
sisting of subordinated securities, and was conditioned upon the grant-
ing of a $950 million lock-up and a no-shop provision.8 5 Maxwell's bid
was an unconditional all-cash offer of $89 per share.8 6 KKR used the
information from both tips in making a revised bid of $90.00 per share
West Point justified their selection of the Odyssey offer. Id. The court also
noted that although West Point's requested relief of striking down the provi-
sions granted to Odyssey would financially benefit shareholders, "shareholders
possess no right in equity to rescind a valid corporate agreement simply because
to do so would redound to their financial benefit." d. at 785. For a discussion
of the reasoning behind the best possible transaction test, see supra note 61 and
accompanying text.
81. JP. Stevens, 542 A.2d at 785.
82. MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1264. For a definition of "white knight," see
supra note 1.
83. MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1275. Compounding an already egregious
breach of loyalty, Evans remained silent and concealed his misconduct from his
fellow directors during the meeting at which the MacMillan board approved
KKR's bid. Id. at 1277. At that meeting, "independent" financial adviser Bruce
Wasserstein falsely claimed that the auction had been conducted on "a level
playing field ... where both parties had equal opportunity to participate." Id.
Wasserstein himself had leaked confidential information to KKR during the auc-
tion. Id. at 1276.
84. The additional information read as follows:
To KKR: Focus on price but be advised that we do not want to give a
lockup. If we granted a lockup, we would need: (1) a significant gap in
your bid over the competing bid; (2) a smaller group of assets to be
bought; and (3) a higher price for the assets to be bought.
Id. In contrast, when Maxwell asked during the auction if it was the highest
bidder, Wasserstein would only tell him to submit his highest bid before the
close of the auction. Id.
85. Id. at 1275. For a definition and discussion of the effect and permissi-
bility of "lock-up" provisions, see supra note 47 and accompanying text. For a
definition and discussion of the effect and permissibility of "no-shop" provi-
sions, see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
86. MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1275.
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minutes before the final deadline for the submission of bids.8 7 The fol-
lowing day, the MacMillan board accepted a revised KKR offer of $90.05
per share that was $1.05 per share higher than Maxwell's competing all-
cash bid of $89 per share, but which included subordinated debt and
was contingent upon the granting of lock-up, 88 break-up,8 9 and no-
shop9 ° provisions. 9 1 The Delaware Supreme Court enjoined the trans-
actions, citing among other things, 9 2 the bad faith of interested direc-
tors who fed tips to their white knight in a supposedly confidential
auction. 93 The MacMillan court concluded that the bad faith conduct
exhibited by the MacMillan directors failed to meet enhanced Unocal
scrutiny, and thus was not entitled to the business judgment rule. The
court added, however, that when director conduct does meet such scru-
87. Id. at 1276-78. Negotiations between MacMillan and KKR continued
through the night in an attempt to increase the KKR offer enough to insure
board approval. Id. at 1277. Although this resulted in an increase of only $.05
per share (the equivalent of $1.6 million in net "shareholder benefit") over
KKR's $90 per share auction-winning bid, this increase came at the cost of an
increase of $90 million under the lock-up provision. Id. Although MacMillan
also negotiated for several hours with Maxwell to specify the unresolved terms
of Maxwell's $89 bid, it never once suggested to Maxwell that it raise its bid,
although MacMillan had made such a suggestion to KKR during the auction. Id.
at 1276-77. Further evidence of MacMillan's bad faith was provided by the fact
that the sale of the assets subject to the KKR lock-up agreement was transacted
on a cash basis, resulting in a $250 million current tax liability for MacMillan. Id.
at 1277. Significantly, this tax liability could easily have been avoided pursuant
to an installment basis sale of the assets. Id. The court found that KKR and
MacMillan had created this tax liability to serve as a "de facto financial 'poison
pill' " in still another attempt to deter Maxwell and prematurely end the auction
process. Id. (emphasis in original).
88. For a definition and discussion of the effect and permissibility of "lock-
ups," see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
89. For a definition and discussion of the effect and permissibility of
"break-up fees," see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
90. For a definition and discussion of the effect and permissibility of "no-
shop provisions," see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
91. MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1275, 1277-78.
92. The court found numerous examples of bad faith in the MacMillan
board's conduct throughout the negotiation and bidding processes. First, there
were the inside tips provided to KKR during the auction by MacMillan's CEO
Edward P. Evans and by supposedly independent financial adviser Bruce Was-
serstein. Id. at 1275-76. For a more detailed discussion of these events, see
supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text. Furthermore, there were additional
instances of bad faith during the negotiations with both bidders immediately
following the auction. MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1276-77. For a more detailed
discussion of these events, see supra note 87 and accompanying text. The court
stated that almost all of the actions taken by the board seemed motivated by two
self-interested considerations: (1) to repel any third party suitors unacceptable
to management, and (2) to transfer an enhanced equity position in a restruc-
tured MacMillan to the management group. MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1272.
93. MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1264-65. The divided loyalties of certain direc-
tors, and the absence of any real oversight by the independent directors led the
court to conclude that the conduct of MacMillan's board did not meet the entire
fairness test. Id. at 1265.
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tiny, "there is no further judicial inquiry into the matter."'94
Among the most recent decisions, In re Holly Farms Corp. 95 and In re
94. Id. at 1288 (citations omitted). These words are significant, because the
court implies that when choosing between competing offers in a corporate auc-
tion, Unocal is primary to Revlon:
If on the basis of this enhanced Unocal scrutiny the trial court is
satisfied that the test has been met, then the directors' actions necessarily are
entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule .... We stated in Revlon
... that in a sale of corporate control the responsibility of the directors
is to get the highest value reasonably attainable for the shareholders.
Beyond that, there are no special and distinct "Revlon duties."
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). This choice of language implies that
defensive tactics in the context of a corporate auction which favor one bidder,
but can withstand the scrutiny of Unocal, may be granted the protection of the
business judgment rule even if they may prematurely end the auction, and thus
violate Revlon's duty of transaction maximization. It is submitted that this is ex-
actly what occurred in Holly Farms and RJR Nabisco. For a discussion of the facts
and holding of Holly Farms and RJR Nabisco, see infra notes 95-98 and accompa-
nying text.
95. 564 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1989). In Holly Farms, two suitors, Tyson
Foods, Inc. (Tyson) and ConAgra, Inc. (ConAgra) each sought a merger with
Holly Farms Corporation (Holly Farms), and were each told by Holly Farms
board that it believed shareholders interests were best served by Holly Farms'
continued independence. No. 10350, slip op. at 3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1988). The
board reaffirmed this position by adopting a poison pill stock rights plan (Rights
Plan). Id. Tyson showed continued interest, however, eventually proposing a
merger of the companies. Id. at 4. At a November 16, 1988 board meeting, the
board examined its alternatives, which included: (1) approval of Tyson's all-cash
tender offer, now at $54 per share, (2) approval of a stock swap proposal from
ConAgra with a face value at the time of the board meeting of $57.75 per share,
but a discounted value of only $54 per share, and (3) elect to do nothing and
retain Holly Farms' independence. Id. at 5.
The board concluded that a sale of the company was in the best interests of
the shareholders and that the ConAgra proposal was the best available transac-
tion financially. Id. at 6. The board came to this conclusion although the Tyson
and ConAgra offers, once ConAgra's was discounted for present value, were
both $54 per share, and the ConAgra offer required the grant of a substantial
lock-up option, a termination fee of $15 million, and expense reimbursement if
the deal was not consummated. id. at 6. Tyson and a group of Holly Farms
shareholders then sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the above granted
provisions and to compel the board to redeem the Rights Plan. Id. at 2.
The court found that the Revlon duty to maximize shareholder interests did
apply to the board from the time during the November 16 meeting that the
board decided to sell the company. Id. at 10. The court held that Holly Farms
board had favored ConAgra throughout the negotiations, believing ConAgra
would allow the company to remain intact, while Tyson would break the com-
pany up. Id. at 11. This lack of good faith led to a flawed bidding process that
could not possibly maximize shareholder values, as was required by Revlon, and
thus the board action was not 'rational' and failed to comply with Unocal. Id. at
11-12.
The two bidders then resumed their attempts to acquire Holly Farms. Holly
Farms, 564 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch. 1989). Tyson proceeded to make an all-cash offer
of $63.50 per share, and began to negotiate a payment to ConAgra for removal
of the lock-up, which would ensure the success of that offer. Id. at 345. The
negotiations fell apart, however, and ConAgra submitted an improved offer with
a face value of $74.81 per share and a discounted cash value of between $66-67
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RJR Nabisco, Inc.9 6 both proclaim MacMillan as the new standard for ju-
per share, and which, although it was between $2.50-$3.50 per share higher than
Tyson's offer, still included the lock-up. Id. at 345-46. The Holly Farms board
tried to reach Tyson to see if it would submit an improved bid, but the Tyson
negotiating team had disassembled, after claiming it no longer wished to partici-
pate in a "patently unfair and flawed auction process." Id. at 346-47.
The board then proceeded to approve the ConAgra offer, despite the fact
that ConAgra required no response for two more days. Id. at 347. Tyson again
sought a preliminary injunction based upon the conducting of an unfair auction
by the Holly Farms board. Id. at 343. The board claimed that its decision was
rational under Unocal and entitled to business judgment protection because the
risk of losing ConAgra's higher bid should the two bidders come to a collusive
settlement outweighed its concerns as to any obstacles the ConAgra agreement
placed in the way of any potential future bids of Tyson. Id. at 347.
The court held that Holly Farms' board had again favored ConAgra in the
bidding and therefore failed to meet its "MacMillan burden" of equal and fair
treatment to bidders during a Revlon auction. Id. at 348-49. This occurred when
Tyson was not given a fair opportunity to submit either a bid free of the
ConAgra lock-up option, or a bid conditioned upon that provision's removal.
Id. at 348. Even when a conditional bid was permitted by the board, Tyson was
granted only a few hours to prepare one. Id. at 349. Despite this finding, the
court upheld the deal, stating that the board was justified in its belief that a
collusive deal between ConAgra and Tyson might still occur at any moment, and
if it did ConAgra would withdraw its $66-67 offer, leaving the shareholders with
Tyson's $63.50 bid. Id. Because Revlon requires that the board consider the
interests of shareholders, and not the possible prejudice to the interests of a
bidder, the court held that the board's decision was "reasonable in relation" to
the threat posed to shareholder interests and entitled to the protection of the
business judgment rule, and "there is no further judicial inquiry into the mat-
ter." Id. (quoting MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1288).
In Holly Farms self-interested directors were able to choose their preferred
suitor, despite the fact that in both auctions they treated hostile-bidder Tyson
unfairly, because their decision saved the shareholders from a potential eco-
nomic loss. The fact that this situation was created by the board's own earlier
self-interested decision to grant ConAgra a lock-up provision did not effect the
court's resolution of the case.
96. No. 10389 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989), appeal denied, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del.
1989). In RJR Nabisco, the Nabisco board instigated a public auction for the
company which resulted in "substantially equivalent" bids approximating $25
billion being submitted by investment firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.
(KKR) and by a senior management group (Management) led by CEO F. Ross
Johnson. Id. at 2. Upon receipt of these two offers, the Special Committee ap-
pointed by the board to conduct the auction selected the KKR offer without
inquiring whether either bidder wished to increase its offer, and the board con-
curred with this decision. Id. at 3.
A group of shareholder-plaintiffs then sought a preliminary injunction to
bar KKR from closing its deal and to revive the auction of Nabisco. Id. The
plaintiffs asserted three theories of recovery, the most significant being that the
Revlon duty to run a fair auction and maximize shareholder benefit was violated
by the premature termination of the auction. Id. at 4-7. The Special Committee
and the Nabisco board claimed that, in accordance with Revlon, "the best inter-
ests of the shareholders" had been the only motive underlying their actions,
which were taken in good faith and with due care, and therefore, the business
judgment rule entitled their decision to deference. Id. at 7-8.
The chancery court rejected all three of plaintiffs' theories, holding on the
Revlon claim that Revlon does not require a board receiving equivalent bids in the
context of an auction to solicit additional bids, but rather a good faith exercise of
1990] 523
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dicial review of target boards' attempts to sell their corporations. 9 7 The
central theme in the resolution of both cases was that absent a showing
of bad faith on the part of the target's directors, the board's choice of
one offer over another during a Revlon auction will be granted the pro-
tection of the business judgment rule.98
III. ANALYSIS
The Unocal and Revlon decisions appear to be pro-shareholder deci-
sions since they place the burden upon the target's board to allege a
reasonable basis, grounded in a corporation or shareholder benefit, for
any defensive action it might take. 99 The insertion of this intermediate
burden of proof presumably would deny the protection of the business
judgment rule to target boards whose primary goal is to entrench man-
agement l ° The most recent decisions applying these standards, how-
ever, have demonstrated that there is still room for self-interested
business judgment is all that is required to protect the board's decision. Id. at 8-
9, 57-58. The court noted that the Delaware Supreme Court's as yet unissued
opinion in MacMillan would clarify the role of the courts in reviewing board
decisions made during an ongoing corporate auction. Id. at 56. Despite not
having a written MacMillan opinion for guidance, the RJR Nabisco court reached
the same conclusion as Holly Farms, which did have such guidance. See supra note
95 and accompanying text. Relying on the fact that the Special Committee's
make-up of disinterested directors provided for an arm's length transaction,
thus minimizing fears of board self-interest, the RJR Nabisco court also sub-
scribed to MacMillan's implication that compliance with Unocal obviates the need
to meet the transaction maximization duty of Revlon. RJR Nabisco, No. 10389,
slip. op. at 1-2, 56-58.
Therefore, without proof of bad faith, directors choosing between two sub-
stantially equivalent bidders in the context of a corporate auction are implicitly
granted the business judgment rule's protection, under the facts of RJR Nabisco.
Id. at 57-58. Moreover, the court found that the Nabisco board's judgment that
the two bids were in fact substantially equivalent, because it was based upon the
opinion of independent financial advisers, was also a valid exercise of the
board's business judgment. Id. at 29, 44-45. It is submitted that a decision by
Nabisco's board that the two bids were not, in fact, substantially equivalent
would be granted the same deference by a reviewing court. Therefore, the only
check on a board's power in this area appears to be the opinion of its independ-
ent financial adviser.
97. See Holly Farms, 564 A.2d at 348 (court stated that MacMillan sets forth
procedure to be followed when reviewing attempt by board to sell company);
RJR Nabisco, No. 10389, slip op. at 56 (court stated that MacMillan opinion
would clarify court's role in reviewing decisions of target board during sale of
company).
98. See Holly Farms, 564 A.2d at 349 (business judgment rule protection
granted directors despite unequal chance to bid given parties in auction); RJR
Nabisco, No. 10389, slip op. at 58 (board acting in good faith gets business judg-
ment protection when evaluating bids).
99. See generally Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182-83; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55; see
also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 251 (Unocal and Revlon force manage-
ment to show reasonableness of defensive tactics).
100. The Delaware Supreme Court opted to insert the intermediate stan-
dard of review in a genuine effort to differentiate between defensive tactics that
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boards to operate, and that it would be wise for the takeover forces to
"watch what the Delaware courts do and not what they say."' 0 '
In practice the courts' application of these standards in recent
cases 10 2 indicates that Unocal and Revlon may be no more successful than
Cheff in deterring well camouflaged instances of management self-inter-
est.' 0 3 Because of this potential for abuse, the image of Delaware as a
pro-management haven will be sustained.
10 4
In both Unocal and Revlon the Delaware Supreme Court clearly ar-
ticulated the principle that whenever shareholder interests are not bene-
fitting from a target board-implemented defensive tactic, director self-
interest will be presumed to be the motive behind the board action. 105
If the company is deemed to be in the Revlon mode, target management
can no longer claim it is defending any corporate policy sanctioned by
Unocal.10 6 Revlon held that Unocal threats do not exist for corporations
might benefit shareholders and questionable tactics designed to entrench man-
agement. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 4, at 250-51.
101. Id. at 274.
102. See, e.g., Holly Farms, 564 A.2d at 342; MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1261;
RJR Nabisco, No. 10389, slip. op. at I;JP. Stevens, 542 A.2d at 770.
103. The Cheff policy-conflict standard required only that the target board,
in good faith and after reasonable investigation, identify a potential policy con-
flict with a would-be acquirer in order to shield the use of self-interested defen-
sive tactics with the business judgment rule. See supra note 28 and accompanying
text. Unocal attempts to remedy the ease with which this test was circumvented
by requiring that the board also demonstrate that the defensive action taken is
reasonable in relation to the threat posed. See supra notes 21-27 and accompany-
ing text. Revlon attempts to further limit defensive tactics taken in the context of
an auction for corporate control, by allowing such tactics only if the end result is
the best available transaction for shareholders. See supra notes 58-61 and accom-
panying text. However, MacMillan and its progeny imply that, minus a showing
of bad faith, the business judgment rule protects board conduct when selecting
between two bidders in a Revlon auction. See supra notes 94-98 and accompany-
ing text. These cases leave the door open for directors to sacrifice Revlon's trans-
action maximization duty in the name of self-interest, thereby inviting a return
to the ineffective days of Cheff.
104. Hyman, The Delaware Controversy-The Legal Debate, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L.
368, 370 (1979). Mr. Hyman contends that because of Delaware's success in
attracting corporations (in 1979, over 40% of the firms listed on the New York
Stock Exchange were incorporated in Delaware), and as a result of its leadership
role in the " 'liberalization' " of corporate law, Delaware is the favorite target of
those who believe corporate statutes are far too pro-management. Id. Although
Mr. Arsht defends the state against such criticism, he does so only after conced-
ing that this "promanagement" image of Delaware exists. See Arsht, supra note
17, at 652. For evidence that this image was alive and well in 1989, see Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 4, at 274 (widespread view that Delaware is against hostile
acquisitions).
105. See MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1280; Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180; Unocal, 493
A.2d at 954.
106. The most recent example of an attempt to shove a transaction into the
Revlon mode in order to disqualify otherwise valid Unocal defensive tactics oc-
curred in Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., No. 10670 (Del. Ch.
July 14, 1989), aff'd, 565 A.2d 280-81 (Del. 1989) (Table). Paramount's argu-
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seeking current share value maximization, since an entity facing an inev-
itable break-up has no policies to defend.' 0 7 Therefore, central to the
resolution of many of the recent takeover cases is a threshold question
of whether the target corporation is in the Revlon mode.10 8
Revlon was originally limited to corporations facing an inevitable
bust-up pursuant to a hostile takeover.10 9 A series of recent decisions,
however, have expanded Revlon's scope. 1 0 Revlon's duty of transaction
maximization is now imposed during any auction for the sale of corpo-
rate control, whether the sale takes the form of an active auction, a man-
agement buyout, or another type of corporate restructuring."'I
One commentator believes that the Delaware courts have grasped
for easy, objective criteria implicit in words like "sale" and "change in
control," and have expanded Revlon's express application beyond
"break-ups" because they fear the line-drawing task that would be re-
quired to interpret a "break-up" in today's complex business environ-
ment."1 2 At the same time the Delaware Supreme Court expanded the
ment that Time's purchase of Warner Communications was a corporate restruc-
turing resulting in Warner shareholders possessing 62% of the combined entity
and therefore placing the acquiring corporation (Time) into the Revlon mode, was
given little sympathy by the chancery court. Id. at 56. A contrary ruling would
have been the death knell of friendly mergers, because all parties to a negoti-
ated, consensual transaction would be leaving themselves open to the risk of
becoming the subject of a Revlon auction. This case illustrates how far the take-
over forces will strain to convince a court that the target is in the "Revlon mode."
For a discussion of the facts and holdings of the Time case, see supra note 64 and
accompanying text.
107. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. At this point, the directors have no other way
to measure the performance of their duties than through "the bank accounts of
the shareholders." Reder, supra note 2, at 281. Such directors have no corpo-
rate entity to protect because "the entity will cease to exist." Id.
108. The MacMillan court explained the importance of this threshold deter-
mination: "Because the effect of the proper invocation of the business judgment
rule is so powerful and the standard of entire fairness so exacting, the determi-
nation of the appropriate standard ofjudicial review frequently is determinative
of the outcome of derivative litigation." MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1279 (quoting
AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch.
1986)).
109. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
110. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345
(Del. 1987) (Revlon duties arise when it is inevitable company will be sold); Ya-
now v. Scientific Leasing Inc., Nos. 9536, 9561 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1988) (court
imposed Revlon duty during private auction of target, but excused board's dis-
crete treatment of sale due to fact that major players in market were aware com-
pany was for sale); Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc., No. 9212 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16,
1987) (court expressly stated that Revlon duties arise when corporation is subject
to change in control). For a discussion of why these duties have been expanded,
see Reder, supra note 2, at 280-81.
111. See MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1285. The court stated that only under
these special circumstances are the duties of the board significantly altered pur-
suant to Revlon. Id.
112. See Reder, supra note 2, at 281. For example, if the proposed acquisi-
tion would require the selling off of just one division in order to finance the
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scope of Revlon, however, it also sought to discourage the idea that such
expansion was without limits. The MacMillan court expressed this posi-
tion when it stated that "[c]learly not every offer or transaction affecting
the corporate structure invokes the Revlon duties."' 13 The net effect of
these decisions is that although the scope of Revlon has been expanding,
courts have carved out exceptions where the duty does not apply, and
therefore practitioners on both sides of a takeover battle must be aware
that there are no bright line rules.
Even when a would-be acquiring corporation is able to convince a
Delaware court that the target corporation was indeed in the Revlon
mode, defensive tactics used by target management to repel hostile take-
over bids are still not necessarily prima facie violations of Revlon.' 14 In
Revlon mode cases, defensive tactics are permissible when they create a
shareholder benefit by assisting the continuation of an auction which
will maximize transaction value.' 15 Therefore, the use of defensive tac-
purchase price, it is not clear whether this sale would constitute a "break-up" for
the purpose of imposing Revlon duties. Id.
113. MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1285 n.35. The court went on to give some
situations where Revlon would not be invoked:
A refusal to entertain offers may comport with a valid exercise of busi-
ness judgment. Circumstances may dictate that an offer be rebuffed,
given the nature and timing of the offer; its legality, feasibility and ef-
fect on the corporation and the stockholders; the alternatives available
and their effect on the various constituencies, particularly the stock-
holders; the company's long term strategic plans; and any special fac-
tors bearing on stockholder and public interests.
Id. (citations omitted). This same reasoning was used in Time by the chancery
court in holding that Time's purchase of Warner did not place Time itself into
the Revlon mode, as the directors could refuse an offer, and sacrifice short-term
shareholder profits, if they believed long-term shareholder interests would be
maximized. See Time, No. 10670, slip. op. at 57-58. For a discussion of the facts
and holdings of the Time case, see supra note 64 and accompanying text. See also
TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., No. 10298 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989)
(board may choose to maximize long-term shareholder interests at expense of
immediate maximization of short-term interests).
Even in Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., a decision which further
broadened the scope of Revlon, no Revlon duties were found on the actual facts
of the case. Although there was a restructuring that resulted in one shareholder
acquiring a larger portion of the target corporation's stock, at no time was sale
of the corporation ever inevitable. Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1345.
114. Even in Revlon the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that defensive
tactics are notperse illegal if their use results in a shareholder benefit. See Revlon,
506 A.2d at 183.
115. J.P. Stevens, 542 A.2d at 781. The court found that the board's use of
defensive tactics were protected by the business judgment rule as it resulted in
board selection of the best possible transaction for shareholders. Id. at 781-85.
The shareholder benefits received in that case were: a higher price by the bidder
receiving the benefit of the defensive provisions; a deal which was more likely to
be consummated, and sooner; and the possibility of an even higher price if the
hostile bidder resorted to the remedy the court suggested-increasing its offer
to the shareholders. Id. For a discussion of the facts and holding of J.P. Stevens,
see supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
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tics is no more restricted under Revlon than under Unocal. The only dif-
ference between the two is that the shareholder interest that justifies
such tactics is much narrower under Revlon.' 16
Although the MacMillan court claimed entire fairness to be a rigor-
ous test, that case may be proof that Revlon duties will only be judicially
enforced in the most blatant cases of board malfeasance.' 17 As noted by
the court, the indiscretions of the board in MacMillan would have gone
undetected but for the integrity of the white knight's counsel, who re-
ported the improprieties." 8 Without this information the supreme
court may have decided, as the chancery court did inJP. Stevens, that it
was a reasonable exercise of business judgment for the board to take the
higher offer, regardless of the number of conditions attached to it. 11 9
Since it will be the rare case where the court has evidence of such gross
director misconduct, MacMillan would appear to be an exception, and
JP. Stevens the rule.
Finally, the Delaware courts seem to have come full circle from Cheff
to RJR Nabisco and Holly Farms. In those cases the chancery court held
that the board's choice of one offer over another during a Revlon auction
may be granted the protection of the business judgment rule. 120 Since
the whole point of applying Unocal and Revlon was to ascertain, as a
threshold matter,' 2 ' whether target management was even entitled to
116. This clarification of the interrelationship between Unocal and Revlon
relates back to Justice Moore's comment in MacMillan, where he stated that only
the responsibilities of the board change under Revlon -the duties are still Unocal's.
MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1287. However, Justice Moore noted that the applica-
tion of Unocal's two-prong test to corporations deemed to be in the "Revlon
mode" is, of necessity, somewhat different:
At the outset, the plaintiff must show... that the directors of the
target company treated one or more of the respective bidders on une-
qual terms . . . [and] the trial court must . . . examine whether the
directors properly perceived that shareholder interests were enhanced.
In any event the board's action must be reasonable in relation ... to
the threat which a particular bid allegedly poses to stockholder
interests.
Id. at 1288 (citation omitted).
117. Id. at 1265.
118. Id. at 1275 n.23. Even the plaintiff in MacMillan conceded that but for
the integrity of opposing counsel, it is unlikely that the tip from MacMillan's
CEO to white knight KKR during the auction for MacMillan would have been
publicly disclosed. Id. For a complete discussion of MacMillan, see supra notes
82-94 and accompanying text.
119. SeeJ.P. Stevens, 542 A.2d at 784-85.
120. Holly Farms, 564 A.2d at 349. The court ruled that the directors' ac-
tion in accepting the offer of white knight ConAgra was reasonable in relation to
the threat of the potential legal liability from Holly Farms' shareholders against
the directors if the offer had been withdrawn and a smaller one substituted in its
place. Id. Because the Holly Farms directors had a justified belief that a collu-
sive settlement between ConAgra and hostile bidder Tyson Foods might lead to
this smaller offer, the court held that under these circumstances the directors'
unequal treatment of Tyson was protected by the business judgment rule. Id.
121. For a discussion as to how the threshold question of the applicability
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the protection of the business judgment rule, the court appears to have
turned these tests into latter-day applications of the Cheff standard. 122
In effect, this automatic grant of protection means that absent the type
of bad faith exhibited by the directors in MacMillan, pro-management
forces should find the proportionality test of Unocal and the shareholder
benefit test of Revlon rather easy to circumvent.
The series of decisions from Unocal through Time has demonstrated
that takeover law has not really changed very much from the time of
Cheff v. Mathes. 12 3 While these recent cases force target boards using
defensive tactics to jump through more legal hoops than did Cheff, they
deter no more cases of board self-interest than did their predecessor.
To illustrate the ease with which target counsel can maneuver their
clients around Unocal, Revlon, and their progeny, it is helpful to walk-
through a hypothetical takeover situation. Suppose Target Company's
("Target") stock is selling on a recognized exchange for $40 per share.
However, market analysts and the other knowledgeable players in Tar-
get's line of business believe the company is undervalued, both because
of bad management and because of a lack of synergy between its various
divisions. These experts estimate that a break-up sale of the company
would bring in $50 per share. Hostile Inc. ("Hostile") believes that Tar-
get is undervalued and that a merger between Hostile and Target would
create synergy and economies of scale that make Target subjectively
worth $80 per share to Hostile. 124 Hostile is convinced that Target is
poorly run and plans on replacing Target's board. Meanwhile, Friendly
Corp.("Friendly") is also interested in Target, but believes the company
is worth no more than $60 per share. Friendly is a holding company,
not an operating company only, and would need to keep existing man-
agement in place in order to run the combined entity.' 25
of Unocal and Revlon is often determinative of the litigation, see supra note 108
and accompanying text.
122. For a discussion of the ineffectiveness of the Cheff test, see supra notes
28-29 and accompanying text.
123. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964). For a complete discussion of
Cheff, see supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
124. "Operational economies" and "synergies" were the major reason in
MacMillan that hostile bidder Maxwell was determined to prevail in the auction
for MacMillan. MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1273. Maxwell believed that "'nobody
could afford' to top a Maxwell bid due to the operational economies and syner-
gies available through a merger of Maxwell's companies with MacMillan." Id. In
such a situation, the higher subjective value of the target means that one bidder
is willing to pay a higher price than a bidder who does not believe such econo-
mies or synergies are possible.
125. InJ.P. Stevens the fact that Odyssey was not an operating company, and
therefore needed existing management to remain after the merger, was alleged
to be a major reason for the favored treatment Odyssey received from target
management during the auction process. JP. Stevens, 542 A.2d at 779. A prom-
ise of equity participation by target management may have also contributed to
this favored-bidder status. Id. For a discussion as to the influence of these two
factors in the takeover area, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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Upon the receipt of Hostile's $40 per share bid, Target's board can
reject it as grossly inadequate, the favorite justification used by target
boards to satisfy the threat prong of Unocal.126 Target can point to the
fact that industry experts value it at $50 per share as a basis for their
rejection of Hostile's $40 per share bid. Target's subsequent implemen-
tation of a poison pill Rights Plan will almost certainly meet the propor-
tionality prong of Unocal as well. 12 7 Hostile then raises its bid to $50 per
share. Target's board, fearful of losing their jobs, decides that, as in
Time, the offer is still a threat under Unocal because the board is putting
long-term corporate and shareholder interests ahead of short-term in-
terests, in this case by remaining independent. 128 Target therefore re-
jects the offer and refuses to redeem the Rights Plan. Hostile then raises
the bid to $55 per share. Sensing that they are fighting a losing battle,
Target seeks out a white knight, Friendly. Friendly offers $58 per share,
and since this offer signifies the beginning of an auction process with
two bidders,' 29 Revlon's duty to seek the highest price possible for its
shareholders is triggered for Target's directors.' 3 0
126. For a discussion of why grossly inadequate bids are target boards'
principal justification for satisfying the threat prong of Unocal, see supra note 55
and accompanying text.
127. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180-81 (enactment of poison pill reasonable
response under Unocal to grossly inadequate bid); Holly Farms, No. 10350, slip
op. at 15 (enactment of poison pill plan may have role in maximizing values in
future auction of company). For a definition of the "poison pill," see supra note
1.
128. The principle that directors have discretion in seeking long-term value
maximization has been stated as follows:
On the level of legal doctrine, it is clear that under Delaware law,
directors are under no obligation to act so as to maximize the immedi-
ate value of the corporation or its shares, except in the special case in
which the corporation is in a "Revlon mode." . . . [Directors] may fol-
low a course designed to achieve long-term value even at the cost of
immediate value maximization.
Time, No. 10670, slip op. at 50-51 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).
129. The fact that there are two bidders does not necessarily mean that
Target is in the Revlon mode. In this hypothetical, the Revlon duty was triggered
when the board sought out Friendly because this was when the sale of the com-
pany became inevitable. Up to that point, Target was free to rebuff Hostile's
offer, as it could claim that Target's shareholders long-term interests were best
served by remaining independent. See Holly Farms, No. 10350 (Revlon duty not
triggered by negotiations with two suitors, or by tender offer of one suitor, or by
board seeking out potential acquirers, but rather when board decided to sell
company). For a discussion of the facts and holding of Holly Farms, see supra
note 95 and accompanying text. The distinction must be drawn that while a
company can, as Target has done in this hypothetical, voluntarily enter the Rev-
lon mode, it cannot be involuntarily forced into this mode by the mere fact that
bidders seek to acquire it-only when the bidding has reached the stage where a
sale is inevitable can a board have Revlon duties involuntarily thrust upon it.
130. In situations where two bidders actively seek a target, a strong possi-
bility exists that Revlon duties have been triggered. This potentiality becomes a
foregone conclusion, when, as in this hypothetical situation, the target's board
of directors begins to actively seek a buyer. See MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1285.
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Hostile responds by offering $65 per share and Friendly decides to
bow out since that price exceeds its estimation of Target's worth. Tar-
get's board, knowing that their jobs depend upon Friendly prevailing in
the auction, offers to grant a crown jewel lock-up option,' 3 ' a break-up
fee 132 and a no-shop provision to their white knight.' 3 3 This gambit
causes Friendly to raise its bid to $70 per share. Hostile seeks to enjoin
these defensive tactics, but the chancery court finds that the tilted play-
ing field created by these provisions is permissible under JP. Stevens
since Target board's acceptance of these provisions led to the share-
holder benefit required by Revlon. l3 4 Hostile perseveres and makes an
$80 per share all-cash offer. Friendly counters with its final bid of $84
per share, $70 of which is cash, with the balance of the offer consisting
of junk bonds Friendly claims to be worth $14 per share. 13 5 Friendly
also conditions its offer on its ability to keep all of the provisions ob-
tained in the prior negotiations between the parties.
Target's board accepts Friendly's offer, in spite of the fact that its
independent financial expert advises the board that the attached condi-
tions and the inclusion of the junk bonds make the discounted present
For a further discussion of what constitutes an auction giving rise to Revlon du-
ties, see supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
131. For a discussion on the effect and permissibility of lock-ups, see supra
note 47 and accompanying text.
132. For a discussion on the effect and permissibility of breakup fees, see
supra note 49 and accompanying text.
133. For a discussion on the effect and permissibility of no-shop provisions,
see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
134. The required shareholder benefit in Revlon cases is the continuation of
an auction to maximize shareholder values. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183. The grant-
ing of lock-ups, no-shop provisions and similar defensive measures which favor
one bidder over another are permissible if such a shareholder benefit can be
alleged. For a discussion of what board actions are permissible in view of the
shareholder benefit test, see supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
Alternatively, a Holly Farms situation could develop if the court does enjoin
the above provisions. For example, suppose that in a subsequent auction for
Target, Hostile sought to pay Friendly to give up all rights under those provi-
sions, rather than seeking judicial invalidation. Target might then accept
Friendly's latest offer, claiming it did so to protect shareholder interests from a
collusive settlement which would lead to Friendly withdrawing its offer and clear
the way for Hostile to submit a lower bid. Based upon Holly Farms, the court
would hold that the board's justified belief that this scenario could unfold would
excuse its continued bad faith in the transaction, because shareholder interests
must be protected even at the expense of prejudicing a would-be acquirer's in-
terest. Therefore, the Target board would have its white knight, even though
Hostile was only seeking to remove obstacles to its acquisition caused by-the
board's prior act of bad faith. For a discussion of the facts and holding of Holly
Farms, see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
135. This situation is similar to MacMillan, where white knight KKR bid
$89.50 per share, with $82 being cash and the remainder consisting of debt se-
curities. MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1275. This offer was also made conditional
upon the MacMillan board's granting of lock-up and no-shop provisions. Id.
Maxwell, the hostile bidder in the MacMillan auction, countered with an all-cash
$89 per share offer requiring neither of KKR's conditions. Id.
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value of Friendly's deal $78, which is lower than the $80 unconditional,
all-cash offer of Hostile. 136 Hostile again seeks to enjoin the transac-
tion, but the chancery court, citing MacMillan and its progeny, upholds
the deal since a target board's decision when choosing between two
competing offers in the context of a corporate auction is entitled to the
protection of the business judgment rule. 137
Target's management has, in the name of shareholder benefit,
forced an inferior deal on its shareholders while primarily indulging its
own self-interest. All of Friendly's defenses to Hostile's takeover bid in
the above hypothetical have been utilized successfully in similar deci-
sions of the Delaware courts. Although the unique facts of a particular
case may have justified the courts' grant of business judgment protec-
tion, the manipulative use of such case law to justify self-interested tac-
tics in other contexts is not a hypothetical problem, but one for which
the potential for abuse is quite real.
Because of the potential for abuse which the recent case law invites,
it appears that these recent decisions will be no more of an obstacle to
directorial indulgence of self-interest than was Cheff. To alleviate this
problem, judicial scrutiny of transactions where the target's board has
"tilted the playing field" must be heightened. In addition, the chancery
courts should deny the automatic grant of business judgment protection
to target boards' choosing between competing offers in the context of a
corporate auction.
136. The MacMillan board accepted KKR's offer under circumstances simi-
lar to those posed in the hypothetical problem. Id. at 1278. For a discussion of
the facts and holdings in MacMillan, see supra notes 82-94 and accompanying
text.
137. The court may reach this conclusion based upon a RJR Nabisco theory,
and hold that because the board had independent financial advice which in-
formed it of the discounted value of Friendly's bid, a board determination that
the two bids' are substantially equal, followed by a board decision favoring
Friendly is a valid exercise of business judgment. Hostile could only challenge
this judicial deference upon a showing of bad faith by Target's board, which
outside the type of director misconduct exhibited in MacMillan, is a difficult bur-
den to meet.
Moreover, even if bad faith in the form of Target board's favoritism could
be demonstrated, the court might, as in Holly Farms, conclude that the share-
holder interests which benefitted from such bad faith are primary to the
prejudiced interest of bidder Hostile, and excuse such conduct.
Finally, even if the court were to enjoin the transaction and compel the par-
ties to resume the auction of Target, the existence of those provisions could lead
to a situation similar to Holly Farms. In this scenario, any attempt by Hostile to
buy the rights to Friendly's previously granted provisions might lead the Target
board to accept Friendly's current offer, claiming that it was protecting share-
holder interests from a collusive agreement which would result in Friendly's
withdrawal and Hostile's submission of a lower bid.
For a discussion of the facts and holding of Holly Farms, see supra note 95
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the facts and holding of RJR Nabisco,
see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Unocal and Revlon were both hailed as providing greater protection
for shareholder interests against the self-interested defensive tactics of
target management in the area of corporate takeovers. However, a re-
view of the most recent decisions indicates that as the Delaware courts
seek to update and clarify this new area of law, they are carving out ex-
ceptions to the strict fiduciary duties of both Unocal and Revlon that make
it easy for target management, in all but the most obvious cases of direc-
tor self-interest, to satisfy this judicial scrutiny.
The message of these recent decisions to practitioners in the take-
over area depends upon which side of the battle one represents.' 3 8 To
target corporation's counsel the message is that although Unocal, Revlon,
and their progeny require a board to jump through a few more legal
hoops than prior law, the hoops are navigable. To increase the chances
of victory in such a battle, target board's counsel should make sure that
the board complies with all of the formalities held to be indicative of
good faith-including the hiring of an independent financial adviser and
the formation of independent negotiating committees.' 3 9
138. It has been suggested that the clearest counseling lesson to be gleaned
from the post-Unocal takeover cases is that "whether one is advising a target or a
bidder: concentrate on independence and methodology and take every reason-
able step to be sure your approach passes the 'smell test.' " Veasey, supra note
12, at 512. Mr. Veasey categorizes the "smell test" as a common sense effort by
the Delaware courts to determine whether the particular defensive tactic at issue
is merely an entrenchment device and if there is a reasonable likelihood that the
shareholders are not getting the best price obtainable. Id.
139. Id. at 510-11. The independent financial adviser must give the board
advice based on present and long-term values and upon the relationship of the
stock's value to the underlying breakup value of the company. Id. at 510. Dela-
ware courts recognize the need for experts with specialized judgment as neces-
sary to a grant of business judgment protection. RJR Nabisco, No. 10389, slip
op. at 44 (advice of financial experts necessary to board's decision competing
bids substantially equivalent); cf MacMillan, 559 A.2d at 1282 (lack of indepen-
dence of financial adviser who acted in bad faith during corporate auction in-
creases board burden under Revlon). To insure a finding of adviser
independence, a board would be wise to compensate its experts on a flat fee, not
contingent upon the outcome of the transaction. Time, No. 10670, slip op. at 29
n.6.
The board should also have a preponderance of outsjde directors, or, if that
is not possible, a committee of outside directors to independently consider the
proposal. Veasey, supra note 12, at 510-11; see Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493
A.2d 929, 937-40 (Del. 1985) (existence of independent board important factor
in court's decision that board met burden of showing entire fairness of transac-
tion); RJR Nabisco, No. 10389, slip op. at 2 (same); compare MacMillan, 559 A.2d
at 1282 (independent negotiating committee could have insulated self-inter-
ested management from influencing improperly conducted auction); Wein-
berger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983) (court noted that had
board selected independent negotiating committee this may have resulted in ex-
oneration of directors found liable for fiduciary breaches).
The use of the independent negotiating committee is important in demon-
strating that a transaction was conducted at arm's length and without self-inter-
est. The existence of such a committee is a material factor in a court's
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The message to would-be acquiring corporation's counsel must be
that friendly, negotiated mergers should be pursued if at all possible,
and that management should only make a hostile bid for a well prepared
target if they accept the fact that the game will be rigged against them
and that judicial intervention will be the exception, not the rule.
Chris J. Pietrafitta
determination of whether the good faith requirement of Unocal's threat prong is
satisfied. The use of independent financial experts is vital in showing that the
reasonable investigation requirement of that prong is met. For a discussion of
the good faith and reasonable investigation requirements, see supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
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